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Given that the Nobel Committee awarded its 
2007	Peace	Prize	to	former	U.S.	Vice	President	
Al	Gore	and	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	
Climate Change (IPCC), and that greenhouse 
gas emissions continue to increase around the 
globe, practitioners of peace and security will 
have to familiarize themselves with climatic 
drivers	 of	 conflict.	To	 that	 end,	 the	 journal	
Political Geography has devoted an entire issue 
to exploring the links between climate change 
and violent conflict. 
In the issue’s opening article, “Climate 
Change	and	Conflict,”	Ragnhild	Nordås	and	
Nils Petter Gleditsch lament the lack of first-
hand,	peer-reviewed	 research	on	 climate	 and	
conflict, noting that “statements about secu-
rity implications have so far largely been based 
on speculation and questionable sources” (p. 
628).	They	cite	some	of	the	recent	documents	
addressing this linkage, including the paper 
for the Department of Defense’s Office of Net 
Assessment	 (Schwartz	&	Randall,	2003),	 the	
Center	 for	Naval	Analysis’	2007	 report	writ-
ten by retired military officers, two German 
reports (German Ministry of Environment, 
2002;	 WGBU,	 2007),	 and	 the	 recent	 UN	
Security	Council	debate	 (UN,	2007),	among	
others.	Nordås	and	Gleditsch	are	correct:	Much	
of	 this	 literature	has	not	been	peer-reviewed,	
nor	was	it	 intended	to	be.	The	links	between	
climate	change	and	security	are	just	emerging	
as fertile ground for both security practitioners 
and social scientists. Now, however, with world 
policy attention focused on climate, they rightly 
point out that these connections cannot be left 
to tenuous connections in white papers.
Nordås	 and	 Gleditsch	 recommend	 that	
future	studies	of	the	climate-conflict	link	should	
better combine climate models and conflict 
models, and point out an inconvenient truth 
about	the	IPCC	reports:	They	only	peripherally	
address the implications of climate change for 
security	and	conflict.	Nordås	and	Gleditsch	also	
maintain that further research on climate and 
conflict should:
•	 	Differentiate between types of violence driv-
en	by	climate	change,	including	non-state	
violence; 
•	 	Recognize	the	capacity	of	humans	to	adapt	
to the positive and negative effects of cli-
mate change; 
•	 Take	regional	variations	into	account;	and	
•	 	Focus more on climate change’s security 
implications for the world’s poor.
After	 these	 common-sense	 recommenda-
tions,	Nordås	 and	Gleditsch	 veer	 off	 course	
with their assumption that the world is becom-
ing	more	peaceful	and	that	the	climate-conflict	
connection	 is	 “self-denying”	 (p.	 635).	They	
point out that conflict models assume that 
the future will look like the past, and they also 
note that the “current trend toward a more 
peaceful world” (a trend measured only since 
the end of World War II) will not be reversed. 
However, the climate models, which have been 
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 extensively developed and reviewed, predict the 
exact	opposite:	The	future	will	not	look	like	the	
past. If, as the authors recommend, climate and 
conflict models should be more tightly coupled, 
then the climate models must lead the way. 
The	second	article,	“Climate	Change,	Human	
Security,	and	Violent	Conflict,”	by	Jon	Barnett	
and	W.	Neil	Adger,	 states	 that	climate	change	
poses risks to human security because “the more 
people	are	dependent	on	climate-sensitive	forms	
of	natural	capital…the	more	at	risk	they	are	from	
climate change” (p. 641). However, this sensi-
tivity is mitigated by social and political adap-
tive capacity, which varies by region and era. In 
one of their most interesting observations, the 
authors	 point	 out	 that	 climate	 change-driven	
stresses can have a cascading effect, with failure in 
one primary production sector causing a down-
stream industry to slow down, thus leading to a 
market failure, etc. While intervening variables 
are rightly identified, this cascade theory is still 
particularly noteworthy because the independent 
variable of climate change is the primary driver.
Barnett	and	Adger’s	main	finding	is	that	cli-
mate change will undermine human security 
in two key ways: by reducing the opportunities 
people have to provide for themselves and thus 
constricting their livelihoods; and by eroding 
state capacity to provide the services that sus-
tain	livelihoods	and	therefore	peace.	They	rec-
ommend three paths for future research, which 
I believe would all help conceptually strengthen 
the	climate-conflict	link:
•	 	Assess	the	relative	vulnerability	of	people’s	
livelihoods to climate change (by region); 
•	 	Connect reduced livelihoods with violent 
conflict (e.g., why do individuals choose 
violence?); and
•	 	Examine how climate threatens state 
capacity. 
Rafael	Reuveny,	in	“Climate	Change-Induced	
Migration and Violent Conflict,” notes that 
climate-induced	migration	appears	in	many	cli-
mate	change-to-violence	scenarios.	After	study-
ing the effects of other environmental problems 
on migration, he adapts the standard migration 
literature to the problem of environmental refu-
gees, and argues that populations can respond 
to environmental changes in one of three ways: 
by staying and doing nothing; by staying and 
mitigating the effects; or by leaving the area.  
Reuveny	examines	38	cases	in	which	envi-
ronmental factors played a role in migration, 
from	 the	 Dust	 Bowl	 in	 the	 1930s	 United	
States	to	modern-day	Bangladesh	and	Brazil.	
Since less developed countries are more reliant 
on the natural environment for their liveli-
hoods, they are more vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change. Environmental factors that 
“push” people to migrate include degrada-
tion of arable land, droughts, deforestation, 
water scarcity, floods, storms, and famines, all 
of which are predicted to intensify as the cli-
mate	changes.	Reuveny	recognizes	that	envi-
ronmental factors do not work in isolation, 
but argues that they nevertheless contribute 
significantly to migration episodes. However, 
“climate refugees” alone do not engender con-
flict; instead, conflict arises when migrants of a 
different nationality or ethnicity move quickly 
or in large numbers into countries that are 
themselves suffering from limited resources. 
Of	the	38	migration	cases	Reuveny	studied,	19	
resulted in conflict.
Reuveny	 concludes	 that	 it	 will	 cost	more	
in the long term to do nothing about climate 
change-induced	migration	than	it	would	to	for-
mulate a policy for addressing the issue. Citing 
two examples of public policy interventions in 
major	migrations,	 he	 concludes	 that	 govern-
ment policy could help mitigate the effects of 
climate change on conflict. However, he has no 
specific policy recommendations for developed 
countries, and warns of high costs without any 
citations to back up his claims. Despite petering 
out	at	the	end,	Reuveny’s	article	is	one	of	the	
more straightforward examinations of the links 
between climate and conflict in the volume.
In “Climate Change, Environmental 
Degradation,	and	Armed	Conflict,”	Clionadh	
Raleigh	and	Henrik	Urdal	report	on	their	sta-
tistical analysis of three climate change effects: 
if, as the 
authors 
recommend, 
climate and 
conflict models 
should be more 
tightly coupled, 
then the 
climate models 
must lead the 
way.
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cropland degradation, freshwater scarcity, and 
population	displacement.	They	mapped	data	
on	these	variables	over	grid	squares	of	100	km	
x	100	km	across	the	Earth’s	surface,	and	then	
overlaid intervening variables, including eco-
nomic and political factors like GDP and pol-
ity	scores.	Raleigh	and	Urdal	stress	that	more	
information	can	be	gained	by	looking	at	sub-
national regions than from national averages, 
since not all of a country’s territory is usually 
under conflict at once, nor do environmental 
stressors fall neatly within national boundar-
ies. Hence, local resource scarcity may be a 
better	predictor	of	conflict	than	national-lev-
el scarcity. Most of their findings underscore 
the conventional wisdom that environmental 
stressors are indirect drivers of conflict, but 
they do find, surprisingly, that “degradation 
and scarcity variables are uniformly positively 
and	significantly	related	to	conflict”	in	higher-
income	countries	and	less	so	in	lower-income	
states (pp. 688, 691).
The	co-authors	 recognize	 that	 their	analy-
sis suffers from one of the key weaknesses of 
statistically-based	conjectures	about	real	world	
events:	The	statistical	mean	often	hides	substan-
tial regional or temporal variations. Conversely, 
the exclusion of information about one coun-
try or region can make an otherwise significant 
result statistically insignificant. For example, 
Raleigh	 and	 Urdal	 determine	 that	 omitting	
data	about	Russia	from	one	model	negates	the	
connection between land degradation, water 
scarcity, and conflict. Similarly, omitting data 
about Niger from another model renders the 
interaction between water scarcity and popula-
tion	growth	insignificant.	Yet	it	is	not	difficult	
to imagine that, on a very local scale, these driv-
ers	would	be	compelling.	Just	because	a	large-
N study does not find a statistically significant 
relationship between two variables across an 
entire sample does not mean that the relation-
ship might prove different if examined on a 
case-by-case	basis.	
The	 last	 two	 articles	 in	 the	 issue	 focus	 on	
Africa.	In	“Trends	and	Triggers:	Climate,	Climate	
Change,	 and	 Civil	 Conflict	 in	 Sub-Saharan	
Africa,”	Cullen	Hendrix	and	Sarah	Glaser	argue	
that	sub-Saharan	Africa	is	especially	vulnerable	to	
the	conflict-provoking	effects	of	climate	change,	
due to existing inequalities in resource access and 
distribution. However, Hendrix and Glaser find 
no significant correlation between rainfall and 
the onset of civil war, though they do recognize 
that	 the	 country-wide	 spatial	 scales	 they	used	
could mask local hotspots. 
In “Environmental Influences on Pastoral 
Conflict	in	the	Horn	of	Africa,”	Patrick	Meier,	
Doug	Bond,	and	Joe	Bond	cross-reference	con-
flict	data	gathered	from	on-the-ground	observ-
ers in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda 
with environmental indicators such as veg-
etation, precipitation, and forage (pasture for 
grazing) in an attempt to determine whether 
the latter might serve as possible harbingers of 
pastoral	conflict.	They	find	that	environmental	
drivers are significantly correlated with the inci-
dence of organized pastoral raids, but not with 
the number of human deaths or the amount of 
livestock lost. 
All	these	articles	conclude	that	conflict	is	a	
complex dependent variable, and that envi-
ronmental measures of climate change do not 
provide sufficient explanatory power without 
taking into account intervening political and 
economic variables. In addition, most authors 
lament the incompleteness of the available data 
sets, which is only to be expected; many coun-
tries do not have the inclination or the where-
withal	to	gather	and	compile	sub-national	data	
sets on environmental variables, and interna-
tional agencies usually gather data only at the 
national level.
I have two main concerns with this issue. 
First, the authors overuse the principle of cet-
erus paribus—all	other	things	being	equal.	But	
when are all other things ever equal? Such a 
relationship is a statistical convenience and does 
not	reflect	the	real	world.	Attaching	too	much	
weight to the existence of a statistical relation-
ship can shut down profitable avenues of inqui-
ry into particular problems, especially if they do 
not occur on a macro level. If statistical correla-
tion	is	what	Nordås	and	Gleditsch	mean	when	
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As	seen	from	space,	land	cover	change	is	far	and	
away the signature imprint of human habita-
tion on the surface of the Earth. What is driv-
ing changes in land use and the environment? 
What is the role of population? In addressing 
these questions, Population, Land Use, and 
Environment presents the goals and research 
directions	of	the	National	Research	Council’s	
(NRC)	Panel	on	New	Research	on	Population	
and	the	Environment	along	with	state-of-the-
art	case	studies.	The	three	sections	of	this	vol-
ume,	edited	by	Barbara	Entwistle	and	Paul	C.	
Stern, focus on land use or land cover change 
where population is a prominent driving force. 
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they look for “more rigorous analysis,” then 
they could miss the forest for the trees.
Second, these articles generally appear 
to conflate the ideas of conflict and security, 
assuming that if a region or nation is free from 
conflict, then by definition it must be secure. 
This	assumption	is	faulty,	as	a	nation	does	not	
have to engage in conflict in order to be inse-
cure.	The	recent	and	startling	data	on	Arctic	ice	
melt provides a sterling example of an emerg-
ing area of insecurity for many circumpolar 
nations that has not (yet) devolved into con-
flict, whereas the pastoral conflict that Meier, 
Bond,	and	Bond	examine	does	not	rise	to	the	
level of a national security threat (though they 
do not claim that it does). 
What the scholarly literature on climate and 
conflict needs now is not more theory or more 
attempts at statistical correlation, but opportu-
nities	to	test	out	the	existing	theories	on	a	sub-
national	scale.	This	issue	of	Political Geography 
has opened the door to an upcoming and 
important field of research.
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